Type of Credit: Elective
Credit(s)
Number of Students
This course attempts to give preliminary and selective introduction on Evolutionary Game Theory and Learning in Games. The main textbook is: Individual Strategy and Social Structure—An Evolutionary Theory of Institute, by Peyton Young.
能力項目說明
This course aims to help the attendees build up the knowledge on some typical learning behaviors and evolutionary dynamics. After the course they are expected to be able to construct models to describe economic systems in which individuals interact and update their behaviors in each period and then to analyze which equilibria such systems converge to in the long run.
| 教學週次Course Week | 彈性補充教學週次Flexible Supplemental Instruction Week | 彈性補充教學類別Flexible Supplemental Instruction Type |
|---|---|---|
A series of lectures on evolutionary game theory and paper presentations by participants.
Outlines of Lectures
1. Overview
2. Varieties of Learning Behavior
3. Fictitious Play
4. Brief Introduction on Markov Processes
5. Dynamic and Stochastic Stability
6. Adaptive Learning and Small Games
7. Variations on the Learning Process
8. Local Interaction
9. Equilibrium and Disequilibrium Selection in General Games
10. Bargaining
11. Contracts
12. Reinforcement and Regret (optional !)
13. Conditional No-Regret Learning (optional !)
(1) Mid-Term Paper Presentations (50%): Choose one from the papers in the references; and
(2) End of Term Report (50%): Reports/Comments on one of the papers in the references, but not the one you presented in (1).
Young (1998): Individual Strategy and Social Structure
Young (2004): Strategic Learning and its Limits