Type of Credit: Elective
Credit(s)
Number of Students
探討財產權之內涵並由權利之特徵剖析財產權結構及治理之關係
能力項目說明
1.具備辨析財產權本質的能力。
2.具備熟稔相關理論與產權問題的處理方法。
3.具備深度閱讀與財產權有關英文期刊能力。
4.具備探索、熟悉土地產權、土地政策與土地法制之關聯性。
5.養成自主學習的態度與策略。
6.具備團隊合作與地政專業知識與能力。
| 教學週次Course Week | 彈性補充教學週次Flexible Supplemental Instruction Week | 彈性補充教學類別Flexible Supplemental Instruction Type |
|---|---|---|
課程內容如下，每兩周進度以各課題為單元進行之:
一、財產權本質與內涵
二、權利之特徵與構成
三、權利之配置與治理
四、財產權之解構
五、財產權之整合
六、財產權與剩餘權
七、財產權與控制權
八、權利之治理結構
九、專題綜合討論
一、依指定課題(期刊、論文等)事先預習
二、上課討論及作業(50%)
三、期末報告(50%)
1. Alchian, Armen and Harold Demsetz (1972) “Production, Information Cost, and Economic Organization”, American Economic Review, 62: 777 - 795.
2. Aoki, M. (1994) “The Contingent Governance of Teams: An Analysis of Institutional Complementarity”, International Economic Review 35: 657 - 675.
3. Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin Murphy (2002) “Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm”, Quarterly Journal of Economic, 117: 39 - 83.
4. Cheung, Steven (1983) “The Contractual Nature of the Firm” Journal of Law and Economics, 26: 1 - 21.
5. Demsetz, Harold (1983) “The Structure of corporate ownership and the theory of the firm”, Journal of Law and Economics, 26: 375 - 390.
6. Demsetz, Harold and Kenneth Lehn (1985) “The Structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences”, Journal of Political Economy, 93: 1155 - 1177.
7. Fama, E (1980) “Agency problems and the theory of the firm”, Journal of Political Economy, 88: 288 - 307.
8. Grossman, S. and O. Hart (1986) “The costs and the benefits of ownership theory of vertical and lateral integration”, Journal of Political Economy 94: 69 - 719.
9. Hart, O. and J. Moore (1990) “Property Right and the Nature of the Firm”, Journal of Political Economy, 98: 1119 – 1158.
10. Holmstorm, B. and P. Milgrom (1991) “Multi - task Principal - agent Analysis: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 7: 24 - 52.
11. Jensen, Michael and William Meckling (1976) “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (4):305 - 360.
12. Klein, B., and R. Crawford and A. Alchian (1978) “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process”, Journal of Law and Economics, 21: 297 - 326.
13. Tirole, Jean (1999) “Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?” Econometria, 67: 741 - 781.
14. Tirole, Jean (2001) “Corporate Governance.” Econometrica, 69: 1 – 35.
15. Yang, Xiaokai and Ng, Yew-Kwang (1994) “Theory of the Firm and Structure of Residual Right”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.