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## What Really is Public Maladministration?

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*What do we know about maladministration in the public sector? Not as much as we should, argues Gerald Caiden. In this survey of the literature, Caiden highlights the characteristics and types of administrative failure, as well as some explanations of maladministration with special emphasis on "bureaucratization." He concludes by providing a list of various "bureaupathologies" and a discussion of how they can plague a public organization.*

Ask people what "public administration" means and either their faces will cloud over or everyone will give a different answer. This question of meaning has always bedeviled the subject and remains unresolved. Yet ask people what is wrong with public administration, i.e., public *maladministration*, there is likely to be an immediate and lively response and the recalling of instances of mistreatment that they personally have experienced or know happened to somebody else. So it should be easier to define public maladministration. Yet, one looks in vain for an extensive treatment in the literature of this obverse side of public administration.

In the United States, this neglect of the obvious may well be because most public arrangements now hum along so well that they are taken for granted and most people do not have to think about them at all, unless they falter. Even so, institutionalized fail-safe procedures kick in for instantaneous correction. Yet every so often, things do go wrong, sometimes horrendously. Malfunctioning goes undetected for too long. The fail-safe devices prove inadequate. No matter how well-performing, somewhere in every administrative system, things are going wrong, mistakes are being made, and justifiable grievances are being ignored.

As administrative practices are part of everyday life in modern society, one would expect that obvious malpractices would be a popular topic among public administrators and that correcting them would be a key concern to researchers. Alas, this has not been the case. Despite major efforts that once in the 1950s went into identifying bureaucratic dysfunctions, there are few studies of particular dysfunctions and no typology of administrative pathologies and morbidities appears in any major text on administration, organization, and management nor even in books that purport to explore the phenomena of counter-productive organizational behavior (Brown, 1987).

## Identifying Self-Destructive Administrative Behavior

As administrative malpractices occur so often, can they be inherent in large-scale administration? Christopher Hood (1974), seeking to classify and explain some of the key mechanisms of such counter-intuitive behavior in British public administration, has identified at least five distinctive types of administrative failure:

- ◆ overkill or diseconomy: results are achieved at unnecessary high cost;
- ◆ counter productivity: results are contrary to those desired;
- ◆ inertia: nothing happens in response to stimulus;
- ◆ ineffectiveness: responses evoked merely rearrange inputs and outputs achieving little or nothing; and
- ◆ tail chasing: the more is supplied, the more is demanded.

He also identifies:

- ◆ under- and over-organization: red-tape (ritualized procedures) and bribery (corruption);
- ◆ wastage: revolving door employees;
- ◆ big-stick syndrome: self-defeating controls and threats;
- ◆ negative demonstration: actions trigger antagonistic or perverse responses;
- ◆ time-lags: delayed responses (fighting yesterday's war);
- ◆ reorganization: structural changes as symbolic responses, tokenism leaving substance untouched;
- ◆ suboptimization: component units defeat overall purpose; conflicting objectives; lack of coordination; and
- ◆ professional fragmentation: shuffling problems and costs around.

In a more light-hearted vein, Thomas Martin (1973) consolidated all the then laws of administrative misbehavior (kludgemanishp) in the world of bureaucracy (blunderland). He cited gems already assimilated into English managerial parlance such as *Murphy's Laws*, *Parkinson's Law*, *The Peter Principle*, and their many corollaries and variations.

More seriously, Robert Kharasch (1973), investigating the laws of institutional behavior (or rather of U.S. federal agency misbehaviors), blunders, and gamesmanship concluded that their malfunctioning was systematic, consistent, and accelerating such that "Our great institutions are out of control" (p. 245). Peter Drucker (1980) came to similar conclusions and stated that "malperformance is increasingly being taken for granted.... All we really expect now...is more expenditure, a bigger budget, and a more ineffectual bureaucracy" (p. 103).

Whereas Kharasch attributed malfunctioning to self-justificatory axioms, Drucker blamed "six deadly sins in public administration:"

- ◆ giving lofty (unspecified) objectives without clear targets, which could be measured, appraised, and judged;
- ◆ doing several things at once without establishing and sticking to priorities;
- ◆ believing that "fat is beautiful," i.e., that abundance, not competence, got things done;
- ◆ being dogmatic, not experimental;
- ◆ failing to learn from experience and feedback; and
- ◆ assuming immortality and being unwilling to abandon pointless programs (p. 103).

Whereas Kharasch believed that public organizations were programmed for failure and could be programmed for success, Drucker was more sanguine. Avoiding the sins would not guarantee performance and results, but at least it would be a prerequisite as "most administrators commit most of these 'sins' all the time, and indeed, all of them most of the time" due to the cowardice of practitioners and the lack of concern with performance by theorists.

William Pierce (1981) went further in listing comprehensive types of bureaucratic failure besides malperformance. He listed corruption (theft of materials, misuse of time on the job, bribery, misuse of office, conflicts of interest), misallocation of resources, technical inefficiency (waste, diseconomies, poor management, inappropriate investments, lack of innovation), ineffectiveness (useless activities, quiet ineffectuality, bad advice, egregious errors), subservience to clients, lack of coordination, conflicting objectives, spoils system, displacement of mandated objectives, favoritism, foot-dragging, arbitrariness, and inflexibility. His study was based on 11 cases of administrative failures in U.S. federal government, variously attributed to inadvertent legislation (written without forethought), ambiguous goals, inappropriate sanctions, incompetence, incompatible tasks, interorganizational conflict, defective management, turnover, excessive workload, and haste to spend. He put forward 75 hypotheses, each beginning with "Failure is more likely...." He went beyond fairly standard American public organization theory by combining these hypotheses within major themes relating to miscommunication, immeasurable outputs, technical difficulties (environmental uncertainty and task complexity), ineffectual coordination, disregard of costs imposed on others, political problems, governmental turbulence, role conflicts, incompetent personnel, nonaccountability, and inappropriate mandates. Presumably all these factors were recipes for administrative disaster if left uncorrected.

### Defining Public Maladministration

The breakdowns of individual policies, programs, and organizations do not constitute an indictment of a whole administrative system. They could always be aberrations,

although none of the quoted analysts thought so. They implied that whole administrative systems could self-destruct. Studies of postcolonial administrations in several newly independent states had indicated that systemically sick administrations did exist, which caused the societies they served so badly to fail to develop and even deteriorate. Unless they were turned around and turned around quickly, their future was bleak. Montgomery (1966) had gone some way in the mid-1960s to catalogue complaints against such obstructive administrative systems:

...resistance to change, rigid adherence to rules, reluctance to delegate authority, sycophancy toward superiors, "target" mentality, indifference to the standards of efficiency, ignorance of the purposes behind regulations, generalist-elitist orientation combined with hostility toward technology...insistence on status and prestige symbols, "formalism" or adherence to traditional relationships while desiring to appear modern; and...job-stocking and overstaffing, corruption, xenophobia, and nepotism (p. 262).

But these were often-heard criticisms of public bureaucracies the world over and read remarkably similar to those of William Robson (1964):

...an excessive sense of self-importance on the part of officials or an undue idea of the importance of their offices; an indifference towards the feelings or the convenience of individual citizens; an obsession with the binding and inflexible authority of departmental decisions, precedents, arrangements or forms, irrespective of how badly or with what injustice or hardship they may work in individual cases; a mania for regulations and formal procedure; a preoccupation with particular units of administration and an inability to consider the government as a whole; a failure to recognize the relations between the governors and the governed as an essential part of the democratic process (p. 18).

Robson quoted from the 1944 Parliamentary committee on civil service training:

...over devotion to precedent; remoteness from the rest of the community, inaccessibility and faulty handling of the general public; lack of initiative and imagination; ineffective organization and waste of manpower; procrastination and unwillingness to take responsibility or to give decisions (p. 18).

Could there be a theory of public maladministration? Although individual administrative maladies have been identified for many centuries, no one has ever tried to combine them systematically. The closest attempt was made by F. H. Hayward (1917) who referred to common criticisms made of professionalism or the dangers of professionalism or professional depravity. Since government service was also a profession, public administration shared them:

- ◆ *perversity*—professionalism became the enemy of the ends which it should serve and resisted innovations;
- ◆ *treason*—professionalism opposed the great aims of humanity as a whole in mistaken defense of its own procedures;
- ◆ *self-seeking*—professionalism sought to acquire power, privileges or emoluments for itself;
- ◆ *cultivation of complexity and jargon*—development and retention of complicated and laborious methods of work and jargon, the tendency to create work and jargon as means of maintaining or expanding professional importance;
- ◆ *fear of definiteness*—professionalism opposed definition and preciseness because they would allow standards by which it could be judged;
- ◆ *hatred of supervision*—particularly from the uninformed general public;
- ◆ *self-praise*—vanity, exaggerated claims made for past professional achievements;
- ◆ *secrecy*—professionalism resisted prying eyes;
- ◆ *uncreativity*—improvements mostly came from the laity and were opposed by professionals;
- ◆ *abuse of power*—professionalism was unchivalrous, tyrannical or cruel towards the weak in its care; and
- ◆ *malignity*—professionalism waged a war of slander and spite against innovators, suggesting they were defective, unpractical, weak, unbalanced, without judgment, ignorant, hasty, plagiarizers, and motivated by self-seeking, self-achievement or private gain (Warner, 1947, p. 63-65).

In these respects, public administrators were the same as everybody else, and they were subject to the same failings.

The study of public maladministration as such had to await the spread of the institution of ombudsman from its native Scandinavia into the English-speaking world. Here, after 1960, was an organization established by governments to receive and investigate public complaints against government administration, a veritable gold mine of information about public maladministration. In 1973, Kenneth Wheare (1973) chose maladministration for special study, specifically showing how remedies for maladministration in Europe were superior to those in the United Kingdom. He believed that maladministration was present in all social organization, that the more administration there was, the more maladministration there would be. While maladministration was difficult to define, most people could describe it by examples (illegality, corruption, ineptitude, neglect, perversity, turpitude, arbitrariness, undue delay, discourtesy, unfairness, bias, ignorance, incompetence, unnecessary secrecy, misconduct, and high handedness). The best that could be done was to quote an ombudsman's definition of maladministration: "administrative action (or inaction) based on or influenced by improper considerations or conduct."

Bernard Frank (1976) elaborated on this position in his view of the ombudsman as an office to prevent:

...injustice, failure to carry out legislative intent, unreasonable delay, administrative error, abuse of discretion, lack of courtesy, clerical error, oppression, oversight, negligence, inadequate investigation, unfair policy, partiality, failure to communicate, rudeness, maladministration, unfairness, unreasonableness, arbitrariness, arrogance, inefficiency, violation of law or regulation, abuse of authority, discrimination, errors, mistakes, carelessness, disagreement with discretionary decisions, improper motivation, irrelevant consideration, inadequate or obscure explanation, and all the other acts that are frequently inflicted upon the governed by those who govern, intentionally or unintentionally (p.132).

Based on actual complaints investigated by the British version of the ombudsman, Geoffrey Marshall (1975) concluded that maladministration was both a matter of instinct and an acquired technique. But the ombudsman office deals only with singular rather than institutionalized instances of maladministration. None of them include crimes committed by people in organizations either on their own behalf against organizational norms (theft, violation of trust, fraud, tax evasion, embezzlement) or at the behest of their organization (genocide, torture, murder, robbery, coercion, terror, intimidation, crimes against humanity, etc.) (Smigel and Ross, 1970).

A novel experiment was tried in the early 1970s at the Institute of Administration at the University of Ife, Nigeria, where 72 Nigerian civil servants wrote case studies of malpractices. Factor analysis pointed to six leading causes preventing initiative—corruption and lack of integrity, community conflict and aggression, inefficiency, sectarian conflict, misconduct and indiscipline, and bad authority relationships. Specific cultural items—“rumor, accusations, denunciations, suspicion, intrigue, threats, blackmail, coercion, malice and inequitable treatment of individuals without cause”—suggested a paranoid personality in “a social climate of pervasive anomie, distrust, and lawlessness” (Bowden, 1976, p. 392). As Yoruba culture was “dysfunctionally distorted toward a schizoid-paranoid form of culture personality,” there could be little room for initiative where suspicion, intrigue, and insecurity were combined with the stultifying effect of authoritarianism in which deference was paid to age and rank. Here was a culture of maladministration akin to repressive authoritarianism found throughout history and exemplified in Nazism, Stalinism, and Latin American fascism.

### **Blaming Bureaucratization**

Elsewhere, institutionalized maladministration is not attributed so much to authoritarian cultures or psychotic individuals as to increasing reliance in human arrangements on the bureaucratic form of administration, i.e., the process of bureaucratization. The critics of bureaucratization see it as being inherently defective and a curse on modern society. They dislike bureaucratization altogether or for what it does

to society, organizations, and individuals. They object variously to authority, technocracy, meritocracy, materialism, consumerism, capitalism, state power, complexity, mass culture, elitism, large organizations, self-serving administration, impersonality, complexity, legalism, specialization, careerism, formalism, dependency, and anything else they attribute to bureaucratization. They seek to reverse the process of bureaucratization, that is, to turn back the clock to before the organizational society or to advance the clock to a debureaucratized (or postbureaucratic) society, to liberate people from organization, and to eliminate rule by officials, to reduce administration by experts, to minimize public sector administration, and this way to make public organizations less dysfunctional and reduce malpractices by reducing individual dependence on bureaucratic administration.

Bureaucratization, according to critics, has been a wrong step for humanity. To reform bureaucracy, to improve it, to make it work better, would only make things worse. It should be replaced altogether with alternatives that are not so inherently bad (O’Leary, 1988). For a start, big government should be decentralized, public organizations made more representative, self-management encouraged, demarchy (Burnheim, 1985) boosted. Both political extremes want to get rid of the administrative state and bureaucratic government (Peters, 1981). While the Right prefers to rely almost exclusively on private initiatives and market forces, the Left prefers autonomous self-governing communities. Less politically motivated opponents of bureaucratization believe that the process of bureaucratization can be reversed. The rigid hierarchical structure of bureaucracy will eventually be replaced by more flexible, participatory, temporary organizations beyond bureaucracy (Bennis, 1973) as machines replace human labor altogether in the postindustrial world. The adhocracy of the future (Toffler, 1971) will be smaller, less hierarchical, more professional, less routinized, more innovative, providing more creative, meaningful, stimulating work and more collaborative, personalized, responsive management. Computers spell the death of bureaucracy. They will reduce the number of clerical functionaries and blue-collar workers, ensure the accurate dissemination of information, eliminate much job fragmentation, place people into electronic networks, minimize paperwork, decentralize decisionmaking, broaden effective participation, and free people from much bureaucratic maladministration.

Meanwhile, bureaucracy has not declined, and the process of bureaucratization has not been halted. Big has not turned out to be so ugly. On the contrary, as people wake up to their rights all over the world and raise their expectations, so they insist on constitutionalism, rule of law, equal consideration, due process, equity, protection, access, competence, regularity, quality, fairness, responsibility, accountability, openness, and those other factors that have promoted bureaucracy, bureaucratization, and bureaucratic abuses. Undoubtedly some cherished values of the past—self-reliance, individual initiative, independence, integrity, the work ethic, altruism, competitiveness—have suffered in the process of bureaucratization, and bureaucracy has been carried too far in some

areas, but this does not mean that other equally cherished values have not gained more and that bureaucracy cannot be readjusted (Hummel, 1982). Yet, there is no denying that bureaucratization carries with it a high propensity for maladministration.

That bureaucracy has inherent dysfunctions has long been known. Its unanticipated dysfunctional consequences have been subject to much sociological analysis. Karl Marx identified the maintenance of the status quo, promotion of incompetence, alienation, lack of imagination, fear of responsibility, and rigid control over the masses. Robert Michels recognized that democratic participation was technically impossible in complex organizations. Max Weber perceived that bureaucracy threatened democracy by demanding the sacrifice of freedom. But it was Robert Merton (1936) in the 1930s who first emphasized dysfunctions that impeded effectiveness when conflicting or displacing organizational goals, i.e., means became ends in themselves. He later identified rigidity, while Selznick (1949) added bifurcation of interests and Gouldner (1954) punitive supervision. These and other dysfunctions (mediocrity, officiousness, stratification, gamesmanship) sabotaged bureaucracy.

Studies of over-bureaucratized organizations such as multinational corporations, armed forces, prisons, legal systems, mail services, and welfare agencies indicate how the functional elements of bureaucracy—specialization, hierarchy, rules, managerial direction, impersonality, and careerism—if overdone turn dysfunctional and counter productive, alienating employees and clients. Its virtues become vices. Whereas specialization was supposed to increase production, too much specialization entailed dull, boring, routine soul-destroying work that brought about careless performance, soldiering and sabotage, which resulted in low productivity. Similarly, reliance on written rules led to excessive red-tape and legalism that actually resulted in goal displacement, group norm substitution, corruption, and discrimination. The career service concept, which was supposed to ensure competence, could result in narrow-minded, time-serving mediocrities. An organization can start out with all the virtues of bureaucracy and soon decline with all its vices, a process which James Boren (1975, p. 7) described as *mellowization* “as dynamic action is replaced by dynamic inaction.”

Jack Douglas (1989) believes that contemporary bureaucracies go through cycles similar to those experienced by ancient dynasties. They begin dynamically and grapple with real problems directly, simply, and successfully. They have vigorous administration and entrepreneurial bureaucrats uplifted with ideas and bounding confidence bending the rationalistic, legalistic forms to achieve their goals. Because they work or work better than any predecessors, people demand more and get hooked on entrepreneurial bureaucracy. They grow, adopt increasingly formal-rational methods of recruitment and administration and become increasingly distant from the people, and stifling. Their efficiency declines and they subvert their resources and power, becoming corrupt and usurpatory, succumbing to machinations that eventually give way to self-serving, change resistant, devious, inef-

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fective, and corrupt bureaucrats. They decline into bureaucratic factionalism, inertia, “the fluorescence of (useless) reform movements” (that mostly rationalize their appeals for more power, money, and personnel), irresponsibility, and self-directing fiefdoms, invoking rebellion by the populace and conquest by new entrepreneurial bureaucrats who repeat the cycle. He compared the dynamism of the Roosevelt New Deal social welfare bureaucrats such as Harry Hopkins with contemporary social welfare agencies:

...some of the bureaucrats are still dedicated, at least when they begin, but they soon burn out from the immensity of the rules, the relative inflexibility of the regulations, and the apparent uselessness and unprofitability of all their efforts.... Careerism, alienation, factionalism, inefficiency, and displacement of goals are their most important products (Douglas, 1989, pp. 407-408).

He largely blamed the informational pathologies inherent in bureaucracy, such as the divorce of income from expenditure and inputs from outputs, the lack of marketing price and profit signals, the absence of proportioned feedback, information distortions and blockages, the emphasis on conformity, the propensity for sabotage, hyperinflexibility, elongated chains of command, enfeudation, conspiracy to defraud and deceive, disinformation, and sheer size. But they are not the only bureaupathologies that attack public administration.

## **Bureaupathologies**

These vices, maladies, and sicknesses of bureaucracy constitute bureaupathologies. They are not the individual failings of individuals who compose organizations but the systematic shortcomings of organizations that cause individuals within them to be guilty of malpractices. They cannot be corrected by separating the guilty from the organization for the malpractices will continue irrespective of the organization's composition. They are not random, isolated incidents either. Although they may not be regular, they are not so rare either. When they occur, little action is taken to prevent their recurrence or can be taken as in the case of anorexia (debilitation) and *gattopardismo* (superficiality) (Dunsire and Hood, 1989).

**Nobody** *admits responsibility. Nobody confesses error. Nobody ends wrongdoing. It is as if the organization has a mind of its own, a mind closed to any other way of doing things.*

They are not just physical either; organizations also suffer definite mental illnesses or neuroses too—paranoid, compulsive, dramatic, depressive, and schizoid (deVries and Miller, 1985).

Altogether, some 175 or so common bureaupathologies are listed in alphabetical order for convenience (see Table 1). They are the most frequently found and identifiable. Any public organization that claims to be free of them is remarkable and probably deceiving itself. All mar performance but none prevent a public organization performing, although if left uncorrected for any length of time and institutionalized, they will eventually cripple the organization and give rise to serious public complaint. Each is fairly easily defined and can be readily identified. Each has its own peculiarities. Each has different origins, takes different forms, has different effects and consequences, and each has to be tackled differently. Taken together, they constitute a checklist for organizational diagnosticians, a checklist that is by no means exhaustive but should cover most administrative malpractices.

These common bureaupathologies can be variously grouped and classified as to administrative activity, external or internal cause, extent of organizational collusion, symptoms, and so forth and could be mapped or arranged similar to a Gray's anatomy of public organizations if such a compendium could be devised and universally accepted. Like diseases of the body, some are quite similar but each is distinct and takes slightly different forms. Some are simple but others are quite complicated. Contrast "account padding" with corruption. Account padding is claiming more expenses than actually incurred. It can or cannot be fairly common practice in an organization to which a blind eye is turned because it costs too much to control, or accuracy is impossible, or the organization needs to build a hidden reserve to cover unexpected contingencies that are bound to occur, or it is criminally motivated and the organization is being deliberately exploited by its members at public expense. It could be corrupt; however, corruption takes on so many forms of which account padding is only a symptom of something much more sinister, hidden, conspiratorial, and immoral if not illegal and certainly dysfunctional. The way one would tackle *paperasserie* (too much paperwork) is quite different from tunnel vision, or tokenism, or ineptitude, or empire-building, or sabotage. The only thing they all have in common is that they run counter to correct administrative norms, or what public administrators believe they ought to practice.

Possibly, the greatest obstacle for public administrators to overcome is that of organizational complacency and inertia. Bureaupathologies often create a comfortable, serene, and relaxed atmosphere in which work is performed after a style and everything on the surface looks fine (Levin, 1970; Warwick, 1975). But dig below the surface, as ombudsman and whistleblowers reveal, and maladies abound and persist. The people in the diseased organization agree that what is being done is unsatisfactory and capable of considerable improvement. As individuals, they all welcome change and reform. They may even be agreed on the specific changes they would like to see made. Plans may have been made, guidelines readied, staff prepared, but they are still waiting for a more opportune moment that never seems to arrive. Or they have kept abreast of discoveries in their field and are keen to try some new ideas. But nobody is prepared to take the first step and the same ideas are discussed repeatedly without any action being taken. Or some people do take upon themselves the responsibility for initiating change and design suitable, feasible, doable proposals, which they know beforehand are acceptable. But they never hear again what happened to their proposals. Nobody knows why. They have been lost in the works.

In such inert organizations, the people are not lazy. On the contrary, they work hard and keep busy coping with daily demands. Everybody appears to be fully occupied, carrying out their set tasks and observing the directions issued to them. Each is loyal to the organization, each approves of its mission, each is keen to do a good job. All are aware of its shortcomings and deficiencies. They know of its mistakes and errors and can recount horror stories they know about. Between them, they have a pretty good idea how it can be improved, and they personally are willing to try something different to improve its performance. Yet, somehow nothing changes. The same old patterns and routines are preserved; the shortcomings and deficiencies are perpetuated; mistakes and errors are repeated. When the organization does change, it moves slowly, incrementally, predictably, and then not always in the right direction.

Such inert organizations fail to adjust in time to changes in their environment. They become insensitive to criticism. They appear not to know or want to know what is really going on. Everything stays pretty much the same. Nobody knows why. Nobody admits responsibility. Nobody confesses error. Nobody ends wrongdoing. It is as if the organization has a mind of its own, a mind closed to any other way of doing things. In fact, by failing to anticipate, recognize, avoid, neutralize, or adapt to pressures that threaten their long-term survival, inert organizations are in a serious state of decline, threatening enormous social repercussions to the economy and society and to the individuals dependent on them for products and services and jobs (Weitzel and Jonsson, 1989). A good shake-up may suffice to reinvigorate them, but already they may be too blind to recognize threats, too inert to decide on a remedial course of action, too incompetent to make and implement the right actions, too crisis ridden to accept the need for major reform, and perhaps even too far

gone to save. This truly is public maladministration in extremis. Although by no means confined to the public sector, it is the kind of public maladministration that lowers the reputation of public administration and leaves a bad taste in people's mouths. The first step to reform and improvement is to admit bureaupathologies and take them seriously. Otherwise, public maladministration will persist and continue to damage.



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**Table 1**  
**Common Bureaupathologies**

Abuse of authority/ power/position	Fear of change, innovation, risk	Lack of creativity/ experimentation	Reluctance to delegate
Account padding	Finagling	Lack of credibility	Reluctance to take decisions
Alienation	Footdragging	Lack of imagination	Reluctance to take responsibility
Anorexia	Framing	Lack of initiative	Remoteness
Arbitrariness	Fraud	Lack of performance indicators	Rigidity/brittleness
Arrogance	Fudging/fuzzing (issues)	Lack of vision	Rip-offs
Bias	Gamesmanship	Lawlessness	Ritualism
Blurring issues	Gattopardismo (superficiality)	Laxity	Rudeness
Boondoggles	Ghost employees	Leadership vacuums	Sabotage
Bribery	Gobbledygook/jargon	Malfeasance	Scams
Bureaucratise (unintelligibility)	Highhandedness	Malice	Secrecy
Busywork	Ignorance	Malignity	Self-perpetuation
Carelessness	Illegality	Meaningless/make work	Self-serving
Chiseling	Impervious to criticism/ suggestion	Mediocrity	Slick bookkeeping
Coercion	Improper motivation	Mellownization	Sloppiness
Complacency	Inability to learn	Mindless job performance	Social astigmatism (failure to see problems)
Compulsiveness	Inaccessibility	Miscommunication	Soul-destroying work
Conflicts of interest/objectives	Inaction	Misconduct	Spendthrift
Confusion	Inadequate rewards and incentives	Misfeasance	Spoils
Conspiracy	Inadequate working conditions	Misinformation	Stagnation
Corruption	Inappropriate	Misplaced zeal	Stalling
Counter-productiveness	Incompatible tasks	Negativism	Stonewalling
Cowardice	Incompetence	Negligence/neglect	Suboptimization
Criminality	Inconvenience	Nepotism	Sycophancy
Deadwood	Indecision (decidophobia)	Neuroticism	Tail-chasing
Deceit and deception	Indifference	Nonaccountability	Tampering
Dedication to status quo	Indiscipline	Noncommunication	Territorial imperative
Defective goods	Ineffectiveness	Nonfeasance	Theft
Delay	Ineptitude	Nonproductivity	Tokenism
Deterioration	Inertia	Obscurity	Tunnel vision
Discourtesy	Inferior quality	Obstruction	Unclear objectives
Discrimination	Inflexibility	Officiousness	Unfairness
Diseconomies of size	Inhumanity	Oppression	Unnecessary work
Displacement of goals/ objectives	Injustice	Overkill	Unprofessional conduct
Dogmatism	Insensitivity	Oversight	Unreasonableness
Dramaturgy	Insolence	Overspread	Unsafe conditions
Empire-building	Intimidation	Overstaffing	Unsuitable premises and equipment
Excessive social costs/ complexity	Irregularity	Paperasserie	Usurpatory
Exploitation	Irrelevance	Paranoia	Vanity
Extortion	Irresolution	Patronage	Vested interest
Extravagance	Irresponsibility	Payoffs and kickbacks	Vindictiveness
Failure to acknowledge/act/ answer/respond	Kleptocracy	Perversity	Waste
Favoritism	Lack of commitment	Phony contracts	Whim
	Lack of coordination	Pointless activity	Xenophobia
		Procrastination	
		Punitive supervision	
		Red-tape	



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