It is well known that a great deal of Heidegger's efforts have gone into interpreting the works of past philosophers. These endeavors have yielded results which should be taken seriously if the present concern with the history of ideas is to remain open and sensitive to a great many novel insights. Moreover, a careful examination of Heidegger's interpretive works may not only bring about a new way of viewing the western tradition of thought, it may also be conducive to a more adequate understanding of Heidegger's own philosophy. His work on Schelling, for instance, not only demonstrates a new approach to Schelling and German Idealism, it also confronts Heidegger's fundamental philosophical question with traditional problems such as God's relation to the being of evil.

Before considering his specific reasons for choosing Schelling's work on freedom we must elaborate on a number of issues which are prerequisite for a meaningful approach to Heidegger's interpretive works.

From its earliest stages Heidegger's thought has been oriented to the history of thought. In the projected second part of Being and Time, he intended to present the basic features of a phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology by taking the problematic of temporality as a clue. The sole objective of this destruction was to unbuild (de-struere) the ontological construction. Here Heidegger starts with the assumption that "Dasein has grown up both into and in a traditional way of interpreting itself." He regards this basic historicality of Dasein as the source of ontological thinking, which in the course of its history is covered up and made rigid. The destruction was to loosen up (Auflockerung) what has been made rigid in the tradition. The unbuilding of traditional constructions is to aim at the original experiences which underlie ontological thinking. Close to a decade after the publication of Being and Time, in his lectures on Shelling, Heidegger speaks of the necessity to "creatively transform" thought's past history.

The second part of Being and Time was never published, but Heidegger's numerous works on thinkers of the past must be regarded as a continuation of the earlier task set for this part of Being and Time. But after 1930,
Heidegger carries out the project of unbuilding thought's past ontological constructions from a basis much different from what was originally to support it. To understand this we must bear in mind that after 1930 it is the "historical" of "mittent-character" of Being that Heidegger tries more and more to articulate. In this way, historicality is no longer limited to a constitutive element in the structure of Dasein. Rather, it is Being's way of granting itself to Dasein which is now said to be thoroughly historical. Heidegger's lectures on Shelling, delivered in 1936, belong to the period when the historical character of Being's way of granting itself to Dasein became central in his thinking.

The following presentation of Heidegger's view on Schelling's concept of freedom goes through four stages. I. A discussion of the incompatibility of freedom and system, Schelling's effort to overcome it, together with Heidegger's conception of system as a historical phenomenon. II. Heidegger's account of Schelling's attempt to develop a system of freedom by utilizing the philosophical possibilities of pantheism. III. The impact of the problem of evil on Schelling's project and his subsequent metaphysics of evil. IV. A discussion of Schelling's notion of evil and Heidegger's question of Being.

I. FREEDOM VERSUS SYSTEM

The most striking feature of Schelling's treatment of the problem of freedom is his explicit intention to expound his views on this matter in a system. His Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom have two goals: first to determine the concept of freedom, second to fit this concept into the close context of a systematic world view. At first sight, however, one can see opposition between freedom and system:

according to an ancient but by no means forgotten tradition, the idea of freedom is said to be entirely inconsistent with idea of system, and every philosophy which makes claim to unity and completeness is said to end in denying freedom. 2

Freedom and system appear to be incompatible because the progressively attained rational unity of a philosophical system is the outright denial of freedom. The system of freedom appears like a contradiction in terms. Heidegger points out that we must take Schelling's awareness of this contradiction quite seriously because it is here that he articulates
HEIDEGGER ON SCHELLING'S CONCEPT OF FREEDOM

the inner difficulty of the entire objective of his work on freedom... so that the question of freedom becomes more transparent. This is to say that the essential concepts and relations of ideas to be articulated in the essay, receive... their first clarification which points ahead toward the entirety of the work.

To grasp the true nature of the tension between freedom and system Heidegger takes two steps. First he gives an account of the historical background of the problem of system, then he deals with the solution Schelling seems to be suggesting for the problem of compatibility of system and freedom. We will follow him in the same manner.

To focus on the historical genesis of the problem of system, Heidegger poses three interrelated questions. What is a system, how and under what condition in philosophy do we arrive at a formation of system, and why is system the battle cry of German Idealism? The word system, he tells us, is derived from Greek ὄντος ἐν τῷ which means "I place together," "I assemble," but in two senses, placing together as "projecting an order" or as "huddling together." Thus system could indicate not only genuine unity but also mere piling and accumulation. Strictly speaking, however, system must be distinguished from an organized and available body of knowledge since it indicated basically

the inner process of arranging (Fuegung) of what is knowable... It is the process of arranging, accessible to cognition, with respect to Being's own pattern of arrangement.

Historically, the possibility of system and the Will to system, as a new way of instituting and establishing human existence, is the distinctive mark of modern time. To see what shaped the intellectual substance of the modern world, Heidegger considers conditions that necessitated thought to construct system. With respect to the objective of knowledge and modes of reasoning pertaining to each branch of it, modern time is distinguished by what Heidegger calls predominance of the Mathematical. The term Mathematical must not be mistaken with the science of mathematics, because this science develops and flourishes as a result of the predominance of the Mathematical and not the other way around. Here again, returning to the original meaning of the term Heidegger states:

the word "Mathematical" stems from the Greek expression τά μαθήματα which means what can be learned... and can be taught.
Such an original sense of the term is transformed in modern time into a
definite concept of the nature of knowledge as such, according to which
knowledge is to proceed from first principles, those not needing further
reasoning.\footnote{Such an original sense of the term is transformed in modern time into a
definite concept of the nature of knowledge as such, according to which
knowledge is to proceed from first principles, those not needing further
reasoning.}

Put forth as a measure for all knowledge this conception demands that
knowledge as such should be based on absolutely secure modes of reasoning.
Self-certainty and indubitability of knowledge are from now on looked
upon as \textit{conditio sine qua non} of knowledge per se. It is this mathematical
requirement of certainty which establishes \textit{ego cogito} as the primary,
evident and certain ground of knowledge and truth. Consequently, any
decision as to what truly “is,” is made with the principle of self-certainty
in view.

To discuss the question as to why and how it came about that system
became the focal point of interest in German Idealism, Heidegger turns to
Kant. He points out that Kant was the first to attempt determining the
“mathematical” feature of modern metaphysics through a Critique of pure
Reason. Philosophical thinking for Kant is nothing other than \textit{teleologia
rationis humanae} (A 839, B 867). Determining the end (\textit{τέλος}) of reason
Kant succeeds in carrying out a \textit{Kritik}, a determination of the nature of
knowledge as experience, but fails to account for the nature of knowledge
which executes such a \textit{Kritik}. Kant did not carry out an examination of the
Knowledge implied in determining the limitations of knowledge. This
failure of Kant serves as an impetus to German Idealism to go beyond his
accomplishment.

To see how Idealism succeeds in going beyond Kant, Heidegger contrasts
the idealistic concept of philosophy with that of Kant. For Kant, Philosophy
is a teleology of human reason. For Idealism, it is the intellectual intuition
of the Absolute. To Kant the \textit{terminus ad quem} of this teleology is given in
the system of ideas. These, performing a heuristic and regulative function
alone, are in an ambiguous status. They must be known as \textit{something} for
reason to be capable of using them heuristically and regulatively. Since
knowledge according to Kant is basically intuition, reason must intuit these
ideas to “know” the ultimate end of its striving. Idealism, Heidegger main-
tains, resolves this ambiguous state of ideas by holding that

intuition, delivering first and essential knowledge must be constituted in
such a way as to encompass the whole of Being, God world and the nature
of man (freedom).\footnote{intuition, delivering first and essential knowledge must be constituted in
such a way as to encompass the whole of Being, God world and the nature
of man (freedom).}
HEIDEGGER ON SCHELLING'S CONCEPT OF FREEDOM

The “whole of Being” as conceived in Idealism cannot be made out of relations and cannot entertain relations to anything other than itself. This un-related “whole of Being” is inconceivable as relative to and dependent upon anything other than itself; it is the Ab-solute. From here on knowledge of Being is not knowledge of something standing over against a “knower” and relative to its categorial structures, but is an absolute knowledge. Here we witness a transformation of the concept of system as related to a “knower” to the concept of system as absolute system. Heidegger sums up the final stage of this transformation with the following words:

From the moment on when the representation of system as absolute system of reason attains self-awareness in absolute knowledge, system establishes itself mathematically, is self-certain... and encompasses every region of beings.8

Seen in this light the concept of system with which Schelling operates is not to be confused with a frame designed for the purpose of transmitting an organized body of knowledge. It is Being’s pattern of arrangement as mirrored in thought. As knowledge of the absolute system, thought appears to be identical with Being’s arrangement.

Returning now to our initial question concerning the incompatibility of system and freedom, we see this question in a new light. Heidegger points out that in the brief introduction to his essay, Schelling is merely satisfied to make mention of a principle which allows system and freedom to be conceived as compatible. This principle states: “like is recognized by like.”9 Schelling, as will be seen later, will have a great deal to say about the substance of this principle. Here, however, let us take this principle as suggesting that system and freedom must be “like” each other in certain respects.

The opposition between system and freedom seems inevitable as long as we take freedom to be “unlike” nature and opposed to it, and system to be merely the end product of thought’s efforts. For Schelling, according to Heidegger, the compatibility of system and freedom must be approached from within the subject matter itself. How can this be done? By noting that what is at stake here is nothing other than the possibility of philosophy itself: the impetus to do philosophy, to gain a glimpse of its hidden ground, is an act of freedom. Freedom is not an occasional object for philosophical thinking but the permanent state in which philosophy is. As

161
PARVIS EMAD

the highest striving of Spirit, philosophy presents an on-going transcendence of beings to their limits. What transpires at these limits is not conditioned by beings, is absolute, unconditioned and necessary. Therefore, to do philosophy seems to be the same as to become aware of the opposition between necessity and freedom, a point explicitly brought out in Schelling's foreword to his essay:

The time has come for the higher distinction or, rather for the real contrast, to be made manifest, the contrast between Necessity and Freedom, in which alone the innermost center of philosophy comes to view.¹⁰

To Heidegger this is the most decisive step of Schelling to embark on a new course of inquiry. He tells us that here Schelling realizes that it is no longer important to grasp freedom in opposition to nature. More difficult and more essential than this negative determination of freedom is the task of differentiating the inner independence of man from the unconditioned, absolute, necessary Being that Schelling calls God. If we put the question in this fashion, the problem of freedom moves out of the opposition to nature and is placed in the realm of man's relation to God:

The ground of all beings is — irrespective of its determination — the unconditioned which, seen from the standpoint of beings, is the highest necessity. Not nature and freedom but the “contrast between Necessity and Freedom” in the sense specified, is the actual question.¹¹

II. SYSTEM OF FREEDOM

Relying on the foregoing preparatory discussion, Heidegger now turns to those issues which are bound to lead to Schelling's major contentions on freedom. Among these issues, pantheism occupies a considerable portion of Schelling's discussion. Why pantheism? What could this “Spinozistic” concept have to do with freedom or with the compatibility of system and freedom?

It will be recalled from previous analysis that Schelling's solution to the problem of compatibility of system and freedom lies in the direction of a principle which allows the two to appear in a new light by suggesting a “likeness” between them. In pantheism Schelling sees a development of thought which, by careful examination, might highlight the issue of a system of freedom. He regards, so it seems, pantheism as a pre-form of
the system he wants to develop. Heidegger points out that Schelling’s lengthy treatment of pantheism is brought about by his concern with working out a principle which is to be used in constructing a system of freedom. He brings Schelling’s account of the versions of pantheism under three headings. These are: Pantheism has been taken to mean that the sum of individual things is God; it has been taken to mean that every individual thing is God; and finally, it has been said of pantheism that it means that basically things are nothing. Now if it can be shown that the ills associated with pantheism are due to a faulty principle used in conceiving the system, it can also be shown that developing a system of freedom depends upon avoiding such faulty conceptions. What exactly is meant in speaking of a principle of construction of the system, Heidegger characterizes with these words:

To look for a principle to construct a system is the same as asking in what sense... does a norm for the process of arranging (Fuegung) pertain to Being;... \(^{12}\)

Consequently, the principle Schelling is concerned with must be structured in such a way as to allow Being to achieve its arrangement in thought without any outside interference. That such has not been the case in the above versions of pantheism is evident in Schelling’s evaluation of these versions. They failed properly to heed the ontological issues involved. Referring to the ontological issues with the term “the law of identity” Schelling states:

The reason for such misinterpretations..., is found in the general misunderstanding of the law of identity or of the meaning of the copula in judgement.\(^{13}\)

With these words, according to Heidegger, Schelling presents an ontological thesis which constitutes an essential basis for the entirety of his thought on freedom. Two things follow from Schelling’s statement. First the primacy of ontological questions in matters of a theological nature, such as pantheism. Here we see:

the theological question [sc. pantheism] necessarily being transformed into an ontological one.\(^{14}\)

Second the relationship of system to freedom or the possibility of a sys-
tem of freedom must be conceived in accordance with a principle of identity that does not ignore the meaning of copula. Schelling explicitly maintains that identity must not be mistaken with sameness or equivalency and he uses the following examples. When we say "this body is blue" we do not mean that "body" and "blue" are the same. Rather, we mean that the same thing called body in a certain respect is to be regarded as blue in another respect. In like manner, the statement "Perfect is Imperfect" does not advocate the sameness of the two opposites, but merely the significance of Perfect as what makes possible Imperfect as its own variation; Imperfect is precisely this variation of the Perfect.

Therefore, when we say "pantheism admits freedom" or "system of freedom is possible" we do not mean sameness of the subject and predicate but their identity. Identity does not eliminate the opposites by levelling down their difference. When considered dialectically it indicates that the opposites and different things originally belong together in a unity which itself is the basis for the possibility of the opposition.\textsuperscript{16}

A system of freedom then must adhere to this conception of identity if it is to make manifest man's freedom in spite of his dependence on God. This is possible insofar as "dependence does not exclude autonomy or even freedom" since it "does not determine the nature of the dependent..."\textsuperscript{16} This is how Schelling arrives at the principle he was looking for in order to develop a system of freedom. This principle is none other than the law of identity when conceived dialectically. Pantheism, purified from above-given misconceptions, is to him the system of freedom or the system of Idealism.

For Idealism, freedom is fundamentally radical independence in a normative sense. According to this conception freedom is inherent in Being, manifesting itself as a norm that each being carries within itself for it to be what it is or what it ought to be. Schelling, however, finds the idealistic concept of freedom inadequate truly to reflect man's freedom. Let us look into this matter more closely.

It will be recalled that system is Being's pattern of arrangement mirrored in thought. To this thought of Being pertains freedom in the sense of independence, meaning normative autonomy of one's nature. To be sure, this concept of freedom is a great improvement over the traditional views of it. Yet in spite of its comprehensive character this concept of freedom
Heidegger on Schelling's Concept of Freedom

is too broad and too general adequately to reflect the factual and genuine human freedom. Now that system and freedom seem to be compatible with the aid of the law of identity, the specific nature of human freedom must be scrutinized in order to go beyond the general and unspecified idealistic notion of freedom. Heidegger seems to describe Schelling's views pertinently when he says that the idealistic concept of freedom, being too general, it lost sight of what marks the freedom of a special and distinguished being. It is not readily possible to grasp human freedom as such, through a general concept of freedom.17

Heidegger goes on to say that the revision is made necessary by Schelling's novel understanding of Nature. What Schelling articulates as a philosophy of Nature is not merely a philosophical treatment of a special realm called nature but an articulation of a new concept of Nature which is in accord with the idealistic notion of freedom. By giving back to Nature its independence Schelling dismisses its conception as an object of experience and lets Nature claim its place "as the Ground that carries all beings."18 This new understanding of Nature together with the inadequacy of the idealistic notion of freedom requires Schelling to reinterpret the idealistic rendition of Being as Idea. This he achieves by interpreting Being as Will: "In the final and highest instance there is no other Being than Will."19 To will means to strive and to desire, but not blindly, since our volition is guided by the idea or the representation of what is being desired and strived for. If one wishes to grasp the full scope of human freedom, one has to go beyond what Idealism has accomplished so far, since Nature is no longer what opposes man but what sustains and supports him. Unrevised Idealism, however, supplies only the most general conception of freedom, and a merely formal one. But the real and vital conception of freedom is that it is a possibility of good and evil.20

Had it seemed up to now that a system of freedom is possible, with the pronouncement that freedom is no longer merely a propensio in bonum, this possibility is called into question anew. If it was our goal to attain Being's pattern of arrangement as mirrored in thought, (i.e., to construct a system), we can attain this goal only after we have determined to what extent and in what sense evil occupies a place in this arrangement. Hence
the problem of the possibility of system is still unresolved in spite of the feeling that we were nearing our goal. The problem of the possibility of the system must be taken up anew, but this time with the specific intention of determining the place of evil in it. This will be our next step.

III. SYSTEM VERSUS EVIL

Before we proceed to discuss Schelling’s major contentions on evil and its relation to freedom, and before we consider Heidegger’s views on these matters, it is desirable to present briefly the outcome of a confrontation of system with evil. This will give us some idea of the impact that the problem of evil has on Schelling’s subsequent course of thought. Let us first make some general remarks on the way Schelling approaches evil. As Heidegger points out, Schelling treats evil essentially in relation to human freedom and not as a separate theme. Furthermore, his treatment of evil does not proceed in the general area of morality because Schelling operates in an essentially ontological and theological framework.

If system is to reflect Being’s pattern of arrangement and if evil exists, then system must be structured in such a way as to be able to include evil. How can one think of evil as inhering in Being, or in Schelling’s language, as originating in God? It is evident that realization of a system of freedom depends largely on how Schelling responds to this question.

If freedom as a freedom toward good and evil is to have its origin in God, and if God has to continue to function as the sole source of all beings, then the origin of evil, independent as it has to be from God, must nevertheless be placed in him. This then is Schelling’s solution: in God there must be something which is not God himself. Accordingly, evil must be traced back to “that within God which is not God himself.” This requires a renewed effort to conceive God in a more original way. Schelling is going to proceed along this line and it is in this direction that he envisions the possibility of a system of freedom.

Schelling’s entire effort to clarify this issue centers on a significant distinction he makes between basis (Grund) and existence. It is no exaggeration to say that his whole thought on freedom, nay his whole conception of Being, rests on this distinction. Heidegger comments on this distinction at great length without drawing upon any work of Schelling other than the one on freedom. What is this distinction all about?
Returning to Schelling’s main thesis on freedom, Heidegger holds that evil represents man as having been set free in his being (Freisein). But having been set free is a basic determination of a being as it is per se (An-sich). In what sense, then, does man’s per-se-ity differ from that of other beings? It is only with respect to evil that there is a difference along this line. Consequently, an elucidation of the nature of evil seems to depend on a clarification of the nature of man, a being per-se. What is his pre-se-ity consisting of? How can we conceive it? Schelling’s distinction between basis and existence provides an answer to this question.

Heidegger maintains that with the aid of this distinction, Schelling tries to think beings in their Being. This Being, however, as we saw earlier, is nothing other than Will. Hence this distinction will have to demonstrate features that are related to Will. In order to grasp this distinction we must keep in mind that it is not readily demonstrable in things as though they were “put together” of a “basis” and an “existence.” Schelling’s difficult assertions about it are mainly directed at the presence of this distinction in God. Why? Because if there is nothing besides God (not only extra Deum but also praeter Deum) then things cannot be observed isolated from him. That is the reason why Schelling discusses the distinction between basis and existence primarily with regard to God. In this respect Heidegger states:

Conceived as the basis of his existence God “is” not yet actually he himself. And yet God “is” his own basis. To be sure, basis is something different than God, nevertheless it is not outside of him. The basis in God is what he himself actually “is” not... This basis Schelling calls “Nature” in God.

Heidegger cautions against misconceiving God’s becoming as a process that takes place sequentially in time. He points out that to Schelling this becoming does not involve any “earlier” and “later”; both these terms are to be taken as referring to eternity:

To this end we must think the being of God more clearly. We are required here to conceive God inasmuch as he is not himself, is a basis of himself; God insofar as he is actually the incipient God who still resides wholly in his basis, not yet stepping out of himself toward himself. This basis, as what God is not yet, does not disappear after God becomes existing. This basis will not be discarded as what no longer is. Rather, since it is an eternal becoming, this basis, as not yet of his existence and the eternal past of his very self, remains in God.
To appreciate Heidegger's words better let us turn to Schelling's text. Discussing the relatedness of basis and existence in God's being, Schelling states:

There is here no first and no last, since everything mutually implies everything else, nothing being the 'other' and yet no being being without the other. God contains himself in an inner basis of his existence, which, is this extent, precedes him as to his existence, but similarly God is prior to the basis as this basis, as such, could not be if God did not exist in actuality. 25

From the foregoing account it becomes clear that Schelling's thought on God focuses on the basis of his existence, or Nature in God as something distinguishable nevertheless inseparable from him. This basis, according to Schelling, is the ground upon which God's self-revelation, creation of the world and man and the possibility of evil rest. The most fundamental character of this basis, according to Schelling, is a longing discernible in it toward existence: the basis longs to become manifest as existing God, it desires to achieve existence.

Having dealt so far with various stages of Schelling's speculative efforts to adjust the system to the requirements of the inclusion of evil, we are now ready to raise two questions. First, whether his project concerning a system of freedom has been fully realized. Second, whether his thought on God, freedom and evil is essentially more than a boundless anthropomorphism. We begin by inquiring as to what precisely is the nature of the relationship of God to the system. Up until now we have been under the impression that to Schelling both are identical. But now he radically rejects any identification of system with God when he states: "In the divine understanding there is a system; God himself, however, is not a system but a life,..." 26 What does this new distinction imply for Schelling's main goal of achieving a system of freedom? As Heidegger points out, nothing less than assigning to the system merely the principle of existence when conceding that system is only in the divine's understanding. Consequently, the other principle, basis, is left out of the system. In Heidegger's words:

If system is only in understanding then the basis and the reflexivity (Gegenwendigkeit) prevailing between it and existence... are excluded from the system. Regarding the whole of beings, then system is no longer a system. 27
Heidegger goes on to say that this is precisely the difficulty which profoundly hampered Schelling's later speculative endeavors and brought about his failure. Schelling never became fully aware that it is his departure from "the unity of basis and existence which makes impossible a pattern of arrangement of Being as system."²⁸

Finally, we must consider the anthropomorphistic objection to Schelling's thought on God, freedom and evil. Is Schelling actually operating with an image of man when he speaks about freedom and evil in relation to God? By detecting an assumption used by the anthropomorphistic objection Heidegger indicates that the philosophical substance of Schelling's thought on these matters is left untouched by this objection.

Taking anthropomorphism to mean that man is being regarded as the measure for all things, Heidegger says is not difficult to grasp. Far more hidden and elusive is the conviction supporting anthropomorphism, according to which, what man is, is a common knowledge. To accept or reject anthropomorphism is essentially ineffective as long as this hidden assumption is not thoroughly brought to light. What man is ceases to appear as a common knowledge when we ask whether it is possible for human thought and cognition to be related to anything other than Dasein in man. Does this mean humanization of what is knowable? Should not this be conducive to asking who man is instead of what man is? Is it not the case that an essential determination of man's nature surpasses him as an observable object, as much as any knowledge of the Absolute falls short behind it? Should not the standpoint to be used for the purpose of determining man's nature, be sought neither in man as an observable object of common knowledge nor in the non-human, the Absolute with whom to communicate everyone seems to hold for possible? Is not man such a being that the more originally he is himself, he is very much other than himself? If man as such a being is being set up as a measure, does the anthropomorphistic objection still make sense?

If we take up each of these questions carefully and examine them, then, according to Heidegger, we read Schelling's essay on freedom with a different eye.
IV. FREEDOM AND THE QUESTION OF BEING

At a time when man's capability to destroy and inflict evil has reached unparalleled proportions, to reflect philosophically on the nature of evil is more than playing an intellectual game; it is almost philosophy's first order of business. By implication or directly, such a reflection could lead to a considered response to the present world historical situation. Seen in this light, Heidegger's treatment of Schelling's concept of freedom may well surpass a mere academic interest.

Both Schelling and Heidegger are keenly aware of the unique importance of the problem of evil and both reflect on its nature: Schelling with all the definitiveness and certainty characteristic of German Idealism, Heidegger with all the elusiveness and caution which distinguishes his way of thinking. Granted that the preceding discussion has succeeded in revealing Schelling's major theses on freedom and related issues, what is there still to be added to this discussion which might highlight Heidegger's stand on these important questions? The answer should be sought, it seems, in the interrelation of two problems of freedom and truth in Heidegger's thought.

Freedom appears in Heidegger's thought as early as Being and Time. In this work Heidegger conceives freedom as "laying free" and as "becoming free." The former indicates how entities other than Dasein are disclosed to it, that is, let free as a consequence of Dasein's understanding of Being. The latter is a first-rate achievement of Dasein, when this entity, by anticipating death, "running ahead into" it (Vorlauf en) as its ownmost possibility, gains access to its true self and to the authentic temporality: Dasein becomes free from the total domination of present time as now, past as no more and future as not yet.

After Being and Time Heidegger thinks of freedom not exclusively as an achievement of Dasein but as its possible preparedness to respond to the call of Being:

The originary nature of freedom keeps itself concealed in the calling by which it is given to mortal man to think what is most thought-provoking.29

What is, we may ask, the nature of this calling? Above all else calling seems to indicate the relation of man as Dasein to Being. To understand this relationship in the general context of Heidegger's thought we must bear in mind that in his published writing, different degrees of emphasis are placed on Dasein and Being. In Being and Time his goal was to
determine the meaning of Being via interrogation of Dasein. In this as well as other earlier works, then, Dasein is central: “Only insofar as Dasein is, is there truth, is there Being.” Yet even in Being and Time the primacy of Being is enunciated occasionally in an unequivocal fashion. Near the end of this work, e.g. Heidegger states:

The ontological source of Dasein’s Being is not ‘inferior’ to what springs from it, but towers above it in power from the outset; in the field of ontology, any ‘springing from’ is degeneration. Since or around 1930, however, this primacy of Being is given more clear expression. If we are concerned with the nature of “calling,” and Dasein’s relationship to Being, we must keep in mind the basics of Heidegger’s doctrine of truth. We should know that for Heidegger Being reveals beings by withdrawing into concealment, that is, truth is this process of concealment-unconcealment. Moreover, Being needs a domain among beings to execute this unconcealment of beings and its own concealment. This domain is Dasein as Da (here-there) of Being, its locus man. It is not for Da to decide if and how unconcealment of beings and withdrawal of Being takes place, since Dasein is “essentially in the cast (Wurf) of Being…” In this manner Da is the domain in which truth comes-to-pass, revealing at the same time a “primordial discord” in the very nature of Being. Beings are manifest as themselves, insofar as they are placed in this domain or clearing. However, this must not be taken to mean that things in their “manifested-Suchness” are totally and exhaustively transparent or intelligible:

each being we encounter and which encounters us keeps to this curious opposition of presence in that it always withholds itself at the same time in a concealedness.

Equally important is the fact that clearing “is pervaded by a constant concealment in the double form of refusal and dissembling.” Accordingly, Heidegger states that concealment is twofold. First there is the refusal of beings to submit themselves to us exhaustively, readily observable not only when we reach the limits of our knowledge about a being. Second, there is an equally observable fact that a being occasionally hides another being, simulates it or, in short dissembles it (Verstellen).

Concealment then
can be refusal or merely a dissembling. We are never fully certain whether it is one or the other... This means: the open place in the midst of beings, the clearing, is never a rigid stage with a permanently raised curtain on which the play of beings runs its course. Rather, the clearing happens only as this double concealment.\textsuperscript{34}

Hence, a discord, an opposition is to be discerned in the very nature of Being, something that Heidegger alludes to occasionally but which is of utmost significance for our understanding of his views on the history of thought. Moreover, it must be kept in mind that by withdrawing into concealment Being denies itself to us so that we see it as "dominated throughout by a denial."\textsuperscript{34} This denial, he holds, is the primordial source of all negation and negativity and is to be viewed as "nihilating" (\textit{Nichten}) inherent in Being. Not only what is hale and wholesome, but also what is evil appears in the clearing of Being. The essence of evil does not consist in pure wickedness of human action, but in the malice of fury. What is hale and wholesome, and its opposite, however, can be essentially only in Being, insofar as Being itself is Contentious.\textsuperscript{35}

What are the implications of these deliberations for the present assignment? Thinking for Heidegger must not be confused with a "mental activity" of a human subject directed at "solving problems." He conceives the nature of thinking more originally: it consists in a response to the call of Being in which freedom is concealed as truth. In his work on Nietzsche he says:

\begin{quote}
The ecstatic dwelling (\textit{Innestehen}) in the Open of the vicinity (\textit{Ortschaft}) of Being is, as the relationship to Being... the very nature of thought.\textsuperscript{36}
\end{quote}

Such "dwelling" of thought reflects inevitably what comes-to-pass as Being, to wit, the primordial discord and opposition inherent in it.

Seen in their interrelationship, freedom and truth, to Heidegger, are indicators of man's admittance into the event of Being. We must not lose sight of the fact that Heidegger reads the history of metaphysical thought in light of this admittance. To be sure, not out of its own fault, but due to Being's thoroughgoing character of denial, metaphysics has not been fully aware of this admittance and has remained forgetful of it. Schelling's concept of freedom to Heidegger presents a strong yet not quite successful
HEIDEGGER ON SCHELLING'S CONCEPT OF FREEDOM

thrust to break through this forgetfulness. We see this quite clearly when we consider Heidegger's reasons for choosing Schelling's essay on freedom as a theme to lecture upon:

Because Schelling's essay on human freedom is essentially a metaphysics of evil, and since here Schelling subjects fundamental philosophical questions concerning Being to a new and substantial thrust, and since up to now this thrust has not been fully unfolded in a higher and fruitful transformation, the attempt is being made in these lectures to interpret Schelling's work on freedom. This alone is the reason for our choosing this work.37

In what, we may ask, does this "new and substantial thrust" consist? Undoubtedly it has to do with Schelling's notion of evil insofar as he conceives it as having been necessitated by an inner process in the ground of all beings. Considering Heidegger's position on the contentious nature of Being, is it farfetched to suspect that he sees in Schelling's concept of God an affinity with his own views on Being? But on what basis can such an affinity be estimated? Is there any justification for maintaining it at all? The answer seems to have to be in the negative. For Schelling's concept of God, as Heidegger points out explicitly, represents the onto-theological thinking of metaphysics and this is precisely what Heidegger tries to surpass via his thought on Being. But, we may ask, surpassing in what sense? Is the onto-theological thinking of metaphysics to be surpassed by overcoming it, or by subjecting it to a process of rigorous examination to determine its ground? Pöggeler describes succinctly how Heidegger conceives this surpassing:

Metaphysics cannot be "overcome" by being subjected to the process of grounding, it cannot be done away with by reaching for something higher than metaphysics. Rather, by yielding to the truth of Being, thought must give up the metaphysical will to produce and secure an ultimate ground. Thought cannot overcome (überwinden) metaphysics, it must try to incorporate (verwinden) it.38

NOTES

4 Ibid., p. 34.
PARVIS EMAD

6 HS, p. 36.
7 Ibid., p. 52.
8 Ibid., pp. 57-58.
9 SF, p. 8.
10 Ibid., p. 3.
11 HS, p. 73.
12 Ibid., p. 78.
13 SF, p. 13.
14 HS, p. 90.
15 Ibid., p. 95.
16 SF, p. 18.
17 HS, p. 115.
18 Ibid., p. 115.
19 SF, p. 24.
21 Ibid., p. 33.
22 Ibid., p. 16.
23 HS, p. 132.
24 Ibid., p. 140.
25 SF, p. 33.
26 Ibid., p. 78.
27 HS, p. 194.
28 Ibid., p. 194.
31 B & T, p. 383.
34 Ibid., p. 54.
37 HS, p. 118.